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CALIFORNIA V. GREENWOOD: POLICE AcCEss To VALUABLE
GARBAGE
IN EARLY 1984, an investigator with the Laguna Beach Police
Department, Jenny Stracner, was informed of Billy Greenwood's
possible involvement in the sale and distribution of illegal narcot-
ics. In February of that year, a federal drug enforcement agent
learned from an informant that a large shipment of illegal narcot-
ics was enroute to Greenwood's residence.1 In addition, Greeen-
wood's neighbors had complained of heavy vehicular traffic at
Greenwood's home during the late night and early morning hours.
His neighbors also stated that Greenwood's many visitors would
remain at his residence for only a very short time. This erratic
activity was confirmed by Stracner who had been closely watching
Greenwood's home.2
In an effort to obtain incriminating evidence, Stracner asked
Greenwood's regular trash collectors to gather Greenwood's
plastic garbage bags, which had been left on the curb in front of
his house, and deliver them to her without mixing their contents
with other collected garbage.3 The collectors willingly complied
with her request. Upon receipt of the trash, Stracner searched
through it and found items indicative of narcotics use.4 She incor-
porated her findings into an affidavit which she used to obtain a
search warrant for Greenwood's home. The ensuing police search
of Greenwood's residence revealed quantities of cocaine and hash-
ish. Greenwood and another individual at the house, Dyanne Van
Houten, were arrested, charged with drug-related felonies, and re-
leased on bail.5
Despite his impending prosecution, Greenwood continued to
conduct the same criminal activities which had led to his previous
arrest. The police again began to receive reports of frequent late-
night and early-morning visits to Greenwood's home. Conse-
quently, on May 4, 1984, another police investigator, Robert
Rahaeuser, obtained and inspected Greenwood's garbage. Since





CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
the garbage again contained evidence indicating Greenwood's use
of illicit narcotics, Rahaeuser obtained a second warrant. Not
suprisingly, the ensuing police search produced more narcotics and
additional evidence of narcotic trafficking, that again resulted in
Greenwood's arrest.6
Although the evidence in question was obtained pursuant to a
valid search warrant, the California trial court dismissed the
charges against Greenwood and Van Houten based upon the deci-
sion in People v. Krivda, which held that trash searches violate
the fourth amendment.7 The trial court's decision was affirmed on
appeal by the California Court of Appeal and was denied review
by the California Supreme Court.8 The United States Supreme
Court, however, reversed the appellate court's decision and held
that since the defendants had exposed their garbage to the public
for collection, they did not possess an expectation of privacy that
society could accept as objectively reasonable under the fourth
amendment of the United States Constitution.9 The following de-
scriptive analysis will examine the precedent which led the Court
to its conclusion and the various underlying rationales behind both
the majority and minority opinions.
HISTORY
The individual right at issue in the Greenwood controversy is
succinctly set forth in the fourth amendment to the United States
Constitution, which states as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.'0
With respect to alleged violations of the fourth amendment rights,
the primary issue is often whether a particular transgression con-
stituted a search, and if so, whether the search was reasonable.
In the landmark case of Katz v. UnitedStates," the Supreme
6. Id. at 1627-28.
7. Id. at 1628. For a discussion of the Krivda case, see infra notes 17-21.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1628.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.




[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.
What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protec-
tion. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected. 2
In Katz, the defendant was convicted of transmitting wagering in-
formation by telephone, in violation of a federal statute. The evi-
dence supporting the conviction was obtained through an electric
listening and recording device that the federal agents had at-
tached to the outside of a public telephone booth. The Supreme
Court applied the above quoted principle and reversed the lower
court's conviction."3
The broad approach adopted by Katz was implicitly limited
by the Supreme Court in California v. Ciraolo.4 In Ciraolo, the
defendants were convicted of various drug-related offenses. The
convictions were the result of observations made by police officers
from an airplane 1,000 feet above the defendant's enclosed prop-
erty. The defendants had been growing marijuana plants on their
property and had encircled their crop with two tall fences. The
Supreme Court concluded that any expectation of privacy the de-
fendants may have had was unreasonable and one that society is
not prepared to accept.15
Prior to the Greenwood controversy, the Supreme Court had
not been presented with an opportunity to address the existence of
a privacy expectation in discarded garbage. However, several
opinions were rendered on the subject by state and federal appel-
late courts."6 In People v. Krivda,17 the California Supreme Court
set forth the approach applied by the trial and appellate courts in
the Greenwood prosecution. The court in Krivda concluded that
the defendants had exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the contents of their trash barrels which were left near their
street for trash disposal purposes. 8 Apparently, the police, who
had been informed that the defendants were in possession of illicit
12. Id. at 351-52.
13. Id. at 351-59.
14. 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
15. Id. at 212-15.
16. California v. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. 1625, 1629-30 (1988).
17. 5 Cal. 3d 357, 486 P.2d 1262, 96 Cal. Rptr. 62 (1971), cert. granted, 405 U.S.
1039, vacated, 409 U.S. 33 (1972).
18. Id. at 367, 486 P.2d at 1268, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 68.
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narcotics, seized and inspected the contents of the defendant's
trash barrels and found evidence indicative of illicit drug use. In
arriving at its decision, the court acknowledged that had the de-
fendants "simply cast their trash onto the sidewalk for anyone to
pick over and cart away, we would have no difficulty finding that
defendants had thereby forsaken any reasonable expectation of
privacy with respect thereto."' 9
The court in Krivda supported its conclusions by noting that
many municipalities have enacted ordinances which restrict the
right to haul trash solely to licensed collectors. Typically, these
ordinances prohibit unauthorized persons from tampering with
trash containers. In light of these ordinances, the court felt that
when individuals place their refuse in trash containers, they expect
their trash to be dumped, destroyed, and forgotten, not inspected
by neighbors and other members of the general public." The
court stated that the warrantless inspection of trash was proper,
however, once it had lost its identity and meaning by becoming
part of a large, mixed conglomeration of trash elsewhere."
Interestingly, most federal and state appellate courts have
taken an opposite view. For example, Ohio courts considering this
question have expressly refused to adopt the holding set forth in
Krivda 2 In State v. Brown,23 the defendant was convicted for
trafficking illegal narcotics based on evidence seized pursuant to a
warrant. The warrant was supported by incriminating items found
in the defendant's garbage. Apparently, the investigating enforce-
ment officers obtained a garbage truck from the city's waste col-
lection department, posed as garbagemen, and seized the defend-
ant's garbage, which had been placed on the sidewalk in front of
his apartment for collection. 4 In affirming the conviction, the
Hamilton County Court of Appeals held that "any reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy that may arguably be present no longer exists
once trash has been placed in a public area for collection. 25
In rejecting the rationale of the California Supreme Court,
19. Id. at 365-66, 486 P.2d at 1268, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 68.
20. Id. at 366, 486 P.2d at 1268, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 68.
21. Id.
22. California v. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. 1625, 1629-30 (1988).
23. State v. Brown, 20 Ohio App. 3d 36, 484 N.E.2d 215 (1984).
24. Id. at 36-37, 484 N.E.2d at 217.
25. Id. at 38, 484 N.E.2d at 218. The court stated that its holding was consistent
with the federal opinions in United States v. Shelby, 573 F.2d 971 (7th Cir. 1978) and
Magda v. Benson, 536 F.2d 111 (6th Cir. 1976).
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the court in Brown specifically stated that its decision, unlike
Krivda, had "not been colored by the existence of a municipal
ordinance prohibiting any person from removing trash set out on a
public street for collection except with the consent of the
owner."26 The court explained that the ordinance in question was
intended merely to secure the orderly removal of trash and was
not intended to impede law enforcement. Similarly, the court
stated that the mere violation of a state or local ordinance, in and
of itself, could not trigger the invocation of the exclusionary
rule.
In light of the foregoing survey, the majority of states and
federal appellate courts were already convinced that a reasonable
expectation of privacy did not exist as to discarded trash.28 None-
theless, other jurisdictions, such as California, maintained the op-
poisite viewpoint.2 9 Thus, the Greenwood controversy presented
the United States Supreme Court with an opportunity to fully
clarify any discrepancies as to fourth amendment protection in
this area.
California v. Greenwood
Opinion of the Court
In California v. Greenwood, the United States Supreme
Court was given an opportunity to decide whether the fourth
amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits the war-
rantless search and seizure of garbage left for collection outside
the curtilage of one's home.30 The defendants essentially argued
that they had exhibited an expectation of privacy with respect to
their searched trash.31 The Court responded by turning to the
principles established in Katz and its progeny. The Court reiter-
ated the appropriate standard, stating that "[t]he warrantless
search and seizure of the garbage bags left at the curb outside the
Greenwood house would violate the Fourth Amendment only if
respondents manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in their
26. Brown, 20 Ohio App. 3d at 38, 484 N.E. 2d at 218.
27. Id. (As an alternative, the Court held that based upon the defendant's admis-
sions, he had abandoned the objects in question and consequently could not object to a
search and seizure of it. Id. at 37-38, 484 N.E. 2d at 218.
28. See infra notes 23-27.
29. See infra notes 17-21.
30. California v. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. 1625, 1627 (1988).
31. Id. at 1628.
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garbage that society accepts as objectively reasonable." 32 The
Court concluded that a constitutionally protected expectation of
privacy with respect to publicly exposed garbage was beyond ob-
jectively acceptable societal standards. Thus, based upon this con-
clusion and the standards set forth above, the Court reversed the
dismissal. 33
The Court supported its decision by asserting that an expec-
tation of privacy for trash left on a street curb is, as a matter of
common knowledge, unrealistic. The Court explained that the de-
fendants knew or should have known that trash left on street
curbs is "readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers,
snoops and other members of the public." '34 Furthermore, the
Court reasoned that one who places trash on the curb does so for
the express purpose of conveying it to a third party, the trash col-
lector. Clearly, a trash collector is perfectly capable of rummaging
through the abandoned trash. With trash exposed, the Court de-
termined that the police cannot reasonably be expected to avert
their eyes from evidence of criminal activity that could be ob-
served by any member of the public. 5
The decision rendered in Greenwood was arguably consistent
with the majority of the precedent. As an analogy, the Court dis-
cussed Smith v. Maryland,6 wherein the police placed a mechani-
cal device, a "pen register," on the suspect's phone line to record
the numbers dialed from his phone. Interestingly, those devices
did not enable the police to listen to the conversation once the
numbers had been dialed. 7 In refusing to suppress that evidence,
the Court stated that "even if petitioner did harbor some subjec-
tive expectation that the phone numbers he dialed would remain
private, this expectation is not 'one that society is prepared to rec-
ognize as "reasonable." ' "38 Consistent with the rationale ex-
pressed in Greenwood, the Court in Smith concluded that a pri-
vacy expectation in information voluntarily turned over to third
parties, such as telephone operators or garbagemen cannot be ac-
cepted as reasonable.
In addition, the Court also looked to the decision rendered in
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1628 & 1631.
34. Id. at 1628.
35. Id.
36. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
37. Id. at 741.
38. Id. at 743 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967)).
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California v. Ciraolo,9 in which the Supreme Court refused to
suppress evidence which was observed from a surveillance air-
plane. 0 Similar to Greenwood, the Court in Ciraolo reasoned that
an expectation of privacy could not reasonably be supported when
such information could be obtained by any member of the public
who happened to glance down while flying over the defendant's
property.4"
Through its effective use of precedent, along with its support-
ive rationale, the majority opinion in Greenwood set forth a well
reasoned opinion, which would hopefully provide national
uniformity.
Dissent
Despite the sound analysis set forth in the majority opinion,
Justice Brennan, writing for the dissent, managed to marshal sev-
eral rather convincing arguments on behalf of the dissenters.
Brennan felt that the determination of expectations of privacy
must be derived from "understandings that are recognized and
permitted by society."' 2 Asserting the existence of a reasonable
expectation of privacy in discarded articles, Brennan stated that a
"search of trash, like a search of the bedroom, can relate intimate
details about sexual practices, health and personal hygiene."'43
Consequently, he felt that most citizens would be "incensed" to
discover that one's trash had been scrutinized by unsolicited in-
truders. Although he could not support this assertion with prece-
dent, he pointed to an incident of public outrage that developed
when a newspaper reported items found in a public official's
trash.'4
Similar to the policy arguments asserted in Krivda, the dis-
sent also mentioned the existence of local and state ordinance,
which prohibited unlicensed individual's from tampering with
trash. The dissent also pointed out that under the applicable local
ordinance, Greenwood was required to dispose of his trash by
placing it on the street curb. The statute in question prohibited
39. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
40. 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
41. Id. at 213-14.
42. California v. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. 1625, 1635 (1988). (That rule was derived
from Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143-44 (1978)).
43. Id. at 1634.
44. Id. at 1635.
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alternate forms of disposal, namely burning. Brennan argued that
because the defendants were compelled to expose their trash, they
could not be faulted for it.45 The dissent also asserted that simply
because one's trash may be open to public intrusion does not mean
that he or she has forsaken his or her expectation of privacy to-
ward it. 6
In the beginning of his dissent, Brennan surveyed judicially
recognized expectations of privacy in containers. He then argued
that precedent clearly would have warranted protection had the
defendants been carrying their garbage bags. Thus, he concluded
that defendants "deserve no less protection just because Green-
wood used the bags to discard rather than to transport his per-
sonal effects."47 Brennan explained that since the contents of the
bags do not lose their private characteristics through disposal, the
defendants' expectation of privacy was preserved.48
ANALYSIS
As the dissent effectively pointed out, the contents of one's
garbage, like one's bedroom, may reveal intimate details which
are considered extremely personal. This argument is difficult to
refute and significantly deflates the persuasiveness of the major-
ity's opinion. As the majority stated, however, when an individual
places his trash on the curb for disposal, he or she does so with the
express intent of conveying those items to a third party, the trash
collector. Based upon the Court's decision in Greenwood, such re-
linquishment was crucial to its holding. As the pre-existing case
law indicates, the Court's opinion is clearly consistent with the
vast majority of federal and state appellate courts. Thus, despite
the compelling logic of the dissent's assertion, the majority has at
least added uniformity through its adoption of a widely accepted
view.
Both the court in Krivda and the dissent focus upon the exis-
tence of state and local ordinances which regulate the collection of
trash. Those opinions essentially argue that the existence of these
ordinances are a clear manifestation of society's interest in the
protection of the privacy of its garbage. As pointed out by the
majority and the Ohio Supreme Court in Brown, however, such
45. Id. at 1636-37.
46. Id. at 1636.
47. Id. at 1633.
48. Id. at 1633.
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ordinances are only intended to ensure the orderly collection and
disposal of waste and were clearly not intended to implicate the
exclusionary rule as a means of impeding creative means of law
enforcement. On this point, the majority is clearly more
persuasive.
Furthermore, the dissent's argument that the contents of the
defendants' trash were protected because they would have been
protected had the defendants been carrying them is wholly unper-
suasive. Although individuals undoubtedly have expectations of
privacy in the contents of their containers, such expectations are
abandoned when the containers are abandoned.
Additionally, the opinion set forth by the majority may also
provide enforcement officers with an effective means of uncovering
illicit activity. As the dissent notes, the contents of one's trash
may be quite revealing. Hopefully, this decision will enable crea-
tive investigators to expose criminal behavior without fear of hav-
ing their efforts prove unproductive due to the suppression of in-
criminating evidence.
RICHARD A. Di Lisi
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